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Conduct of Attorneys: Group Practice
and Representation, and Significant
Developments in Ohio Disciplinary
Matters
Samuel T. Gaines
ISCIPLINARY MATTERS and impermissible conduct of attorneys by state standards viewed from the perspective of constitutionally protected rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution occupied the stage front and
center in the last two years. Making their presence known and soon
perhaps to move boldly into the spotlight were group legal service
plans spawned by societal pressures, both "Great" and otherTHE AUTHOR (A.B., Middlebury Cwise, and the role of the attorlege, LL.B., Western Reserve University) is a practicing attorney in Cleveney at law in the confrontation
land, Ohio.
sometimes styled fair trial versus free press.'
I.

A.

DISCIPLINARY MATTERS

DisbarmentOrders

Before January 1, 1957, the date on which Rule XXVII of the
Ohio Supreme Court became effective, a disbarred attorney could apply for reinstatement.2 However, Rule XXVII' does not provide
for reinstatement once an order of disbarment is made. Such an
1. Limitations of space prevent as exhaustive a consideration of some of the matters
here dealt with as is deserved. Each of several, alone, could well be the subject of a
lead article. For similar reasons the decisions and developments which are here dealt
with are confined to such as are concerned with direct lawyer conduct. Outside this
orbit, for instance, is so interesting and engrossing a case as Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963), overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), and holding
that the fourteenth amendment requires states to provide lawyers for indigent defendants. LEwis, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 188-89 (1964). So, too, is Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478 (1964), holding the constitutional right of lawyer consultation exists
whenever the interrogatory process shifts from investigatory to accusatory. Similarly of
great interest is congressional action providing for payment of lawyers and for investigatory services in federal court assignments of counsel.
2. OHio GEN. CODE § 1707,111 Ohio Laws 411 (1925) (now OHIO REV. CODE S
4705.02 amended without substantial change.)
3. Now OHIO SUP. CT. R. XVIII, 176 Ohio St. liii (1964), as amended, March 11,
1964, without change.
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order is now "absolutely final."'
The question remained as to
whether one disbarred before January 1, 1957, is governed by
the statutory procedure then in effect and never repealed by the General Assembly, or by the provisions of Rule XXVII. The Ohio Supreme Court, in an opinion which emphasizes its exclusive domain
in "all matters relating to discipline and reinstatement,"' considered
a statute in this area as an "aid to" but not "a limitation on"6 the
power of the court. It held its present procedures retroactive, but
with commendable fairness considered an order of disbarment prior
to January 1, 1957, as equivalent to an order of only indefinite suspension under Rule XXVII. This interpretation allows for the filing of a petition for reinstatement,7 but it points up the devastating
consequence of an order of disbarment under the present rule.
In the years 1963 and 1964, the Ohio Supreme Court entered
two orders of disbarment in contested matters. In one case,' it was
alleged that respondent had solicited professional employment, attempted to collect fees in excess of those agreed upon, offered money
in an attempt to influence a police officer to drop a case, offered a
lay claim agent a split of fees for referrals of cases and for payment
of an unfounded claim, and offered money to a person to inflict
bodily injury or death upon a female person respondent claimed was
"bugging him."9 Upon oral argument in the supreme court, it was
suggested, for the first time, by counsel for respondent that the latter was mentally ill. To this all but one member of the court turned
a deaf ear. The dissenting judge, observing that the respondent had
been and continued to be confined in a psychiatric security ward upon a probate court commitment, would have paid heed to the mental illness claim and suspended the respondent only indefinitely.1"
4. In re Nevius, 174 Ohio St. 560, 191 N.E.2d 166 (1963).
5. Id. at 562, 191 N.E.2d at 169; accord, Mahoning Bar Ass'n v. Franko, 168 Ohio St.
17, 151 N.E.2d 17 (1958); Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Pleasant, 167 Ohio St. 325, 148
N.E.2d 493 (1958); In re McBride, 164 Ohio St. 419, 132 N.E.2d 113 (1956).
6. In re Nevius, 174 Ohio St. 560, 191 N.E.2d 166 (1963).
7. OHIO SUP. CT. R. XVIII(21): "No petition for reinstatement to the practice of
law shall be entertained by this Court and the same may not be filed in this Court,
within a period of two (2) years after the entry of an order suspending for an indefinite period the Petitioner from the practice of law in this State, or within a period
of two (2) years after the denial of a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law
filed by such Petitioner."
8. Dayton Bar Ass'n v. Kemper, 175 Ohio St. 285, 194 N.E.2d 431 (1963), cert.

denied, 379 U.S. 817 (1964).
9. Id. at 286, 194 N.E.2d at 432.
10. Id. at 288, 194 N.E.2d at 433 (dissent) noting OHIO SUP. CT. R. XXVIII(l),

now OHIO SuP. CT. 1K XIX(1), 176 Ohio St. lxiii (1964), as amended without
change, stating that "These rules of professional conduct shall be binding upon all
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Thus, the question still remains as to whether a plea of mental illness, supported by adequate proof and presented at the outset of the
board's hearing, might have won more of the members of the court
to the view of the dissenting opinion.
In the other case" where disbarment was ordered, the respondent
admitted -depositing in his own account and using for his own purposes a check for $17,582.19 which he had received for his client.
The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline concluded that "respondent was guilty of embezzling.., and that [he]
lacks understanding of the ethics of the profession and the duties
of a lawyer to his clients and to the public."' 2 Respondent's claim
was that his client had loaned him the money. The court found
this defense to be belated and impossible to believe.' 3 The court
concluded that the respondent's misappropriation of the money of
his client and his issuance of checks dishonored by reason of insufficient funds violated Canon 11,14 which is directed to improprieties
in dealing with trust property, and that the "totality of his conduct"' 5 '
violated Canon 29,16 which makes it the duty ofan attorney "to uphold the. honor- and to maintain the dignity of the profession,. .'
Apparently, the court was unable to find -any mitigating circumstances.
B.

ind'jinite Suspensions

.

Indefinite suspension from the practice of law was the discipline
meted out for a wide variety of derelictions of professional obligations ,n the past two years. In one case, the respondent perpetrated
a borxb hoax on a civil aircraft for which he was convicted and
Commingling or misuse of
sentenced to a correctional institution.'
a client's finds, or both, was the misconduct common to several cases.
members admitted to practice law in the State of Ohio, and the wilful breach thereof
shall be punished by reprimand, by suspension or by disbarment, as.provided in Rule
XVIII of the Rules of Practice." (Emphasis added.)
11. Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Siegel, 176 Ohio St. 277, 199 N.E.2d 576 (1964).
12. Id. at 279, 199 N.E.2d at 578.
13. Id. at 280, 199 N.E.2d at 578.
14. "Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming
into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly, and
should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him."
Canon 11, 5 (2), in 176 Ohio St. lxv (1964).
15. Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Siegel, 176 Ohio St. 277, 280, 199 N.E.2d 576, 578
(1964)..
16. Canon 29 requires that an attorney "should strive at all times to uphold the
honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law
but the administration of justice." 176 Ohio St. lxxii (1964).
17. Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Smith, 174 Ohio St. 452, 190 N.E.2d 267 (1963).
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Commingling in one instance was accompanied by inferred use and
delayed distribution of a client's share of a settlement, and this
misconduct was coupled with the mishandling of an estate in which
respondent misstated inventory and schedule of debts, failed to account for receipts and expenditures as required by statute, and failed
to heed the court's requests and orders.'" In another case, there was
both commingling of estate funds and conversion thereof to respondent's own use, together with the issuance of checks dishonored for insufficient funds. 9 In still another case there was an
improper handling of professional financial accounts and here indefinite suspension was imposed, even though the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline had recommended only a
public reprimand.2" In a case involving failure to file income tax
returns, the court by-passed the more severe penalty of disbarment
and imposed the penalty of indefinite suspension. The court candidly
admitted that it avoided a finding that such a crime involved moral
turpitude,2 considered a violation of Canon 2922 which calls upon
an attorney at all times to uphold the honor of the profession, and
Canon 3223 which makes it incumbent upon an attorney to observe
statute law, all of which amounts to misconduct as defined by subdivision (5) (a) of Rule XVIII.24 Indefinite suspension was also
imposed in cases involving: conviction of the crime of obtaining
money under false pretenses;25 conviction of the crime of impeding
the administration of justice by burning records relevant to a federal
grand jury inquiry.26
Two other instances where the court imposed this penalty involved the division of fees between a lawyer and lay workmen's
compensation consultants or investigators after the court had held
18. Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Margulis, 174 Ohio St. 263, 189 N.E.2d 88 (1963).
19. Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Fodor, 175 Ohio St. 21, 190 N.E.2d 920 (1963).
20. Akron Bar Ass'n v. Thompson, 38 OHIO BAR 4 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1965).
21. Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Bilinski, 177 Ohio St. 43, 201 N.E.2d 878 (1964). But
see Dayton Bar Ass'n v. Prear, 175 Ohio St. 543, 548, 196 N.E.2d 773, 777 (1964)
(dissenting opinion) where Judge Gibson states that failure to file income tax returns
is not base or vile or depraved so as to constitute moral turpitude.
22. See note 16 supra.
23. Canon 32 requires that an attorney "must also observe and advise his client to
observe the statute law..
"
24. "Misconduct shall mean any violation of any provision of the oath of office taken
upon admission to practice of law in this State, or any violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics or the Canons of Judicial Ethics as adopted by the Court from time to
time, or the commission or conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude." OHIO
Sup. CT. R. XVIII(5) (a), 176 Ohio St. liii (1964).
25. Clermont County Bar Ass'n v. Ellis, 175 Ohio St. 538, 196 N.E.2d 769 (1964).
26. Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Leggett, 176 Ohio St. 281, 199 N.E.2d 590 (1964).
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that the rendition of services in the preparation and presentation of
claims for compensation arising under the Workmen's Compensation Laws of Ohio for a fee constitutes the practice of law,27 notwithstanding statutory permission for lay participation in such activities,28 and an arrangement with a New York law firm representing
the Transport Workers Union whereby officers thereof would publicize respondents availability to represent union members in FELA
cases, and would bring such members to his office to employ respondent as such counsel. The arrangement further provided that
respondent would remit 25 per cent of his fee to said firm, even
though the client did not know or see the latter firm and the respondent had very little more contact with it.29 In a case involving
the lending of money to clients where it was obvious that the only
reasonable source of the client's ability to repay would be the proceeds received by the client on trial or settlement of his claim, the
court concluded that such conduct amounted to a purchase by the
attorney of an interest in the subject matter of the litigation he was
conducting."0 In so holding, the court found inapplicable previous
decisions to the contrary 3 which had been pronounced before the
court had adopted by rule the Canons of Professional Ethics. In
the same case, the courts held improper the fact that respondent had
employed a railroad employee as an accident investigator, and some
of the accidents were ones in which his regular employer was involved. The respondent had been previously found guilty of unprofessional conduct in the solicitation of professional employment,
and the court deemed him to be unprofessional in his attitude of
not paying the costs of that litigation until more than five years
had elapsed and the instant proceedings had been instituted. 2 .
3 3 respondent
In the case of Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Dargusch,
was chairman of the board of a corporation, his law firm was the
27.

In re Brown, Weiss & Wohl, 175 Ohio St. 149, 192 N.E.2d 54 (1963).

28. Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Agee, 175 Ohio St. 443, 196 N.E.2d 98, cert, denied, 379
U.S. 7 (1964); Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Juris, 175 Ohio St. 449, 196 N.E.2d 94, cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 9 (1964).
29. Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Potts, 175 Ohio St. 101, 191 N.E.2d 728 (1963). But ef.
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964), discussed infra at p. 904.
30. Canon 10 reads: "The lawyer should not purchase any interest in the subjectmatter of the litigation which he is conducting."
31. Roberts v. Montgomery, 115 Ohio St. 502, 154 N.E. 740 (1920); Scheinesohn
v. Lemonek, 84 Ohio St. 424, 95 N.E. 913 (1911); Reece v. Kyle, 49 Ohio St. 475, 31
N.E. 747 (1892).
32. Mahoning County Bar Ass'n v. Ruffalo, 176 Ohio St. 263, 199 N.E.2d 396, cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 931 (1964).
33. 177 Ohio St. 95, 202 N.Y2d 625 (1964).
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corporation's general counsel on a retainer fee basis, and he occupied the position of trustee of each of three living trusts owning 90
per cent of the corporation's stock. The court found that respondent
had committed the following improprieties. He had caused the
corporation to pay his personal club dues and bills, travel and entertainment expenses and liquor bills, all of which were unrelated
to the business of the corporation and of which at least one of the
beneficiaries of the trusts was not informed. He had arranged a
loan of $70,000 to the corporation from one of the trusts, for which
the corporation had paid the trust a finder's fee of $2,500. In addition, respondent's law firm received $900 from the trust in legal
fees for work in connection therewith, although it is generally acknowledged that the borrower, not the lender, pays legal fees arising in such circumstances. At the same time, respondent's law firm
was general counsel for the borrower, all of which the beneficiary
of one of the trusts was unaware of. The respondent had also voted
the stock of the three trusts in favor of a certain resolution which
provided continued salary payments to his heirs and widow in the
event of his decease. This resolution amounted to a distinct benefit
to his heirs and widow, but a detriment to the corporation and to
the beneficiaries of the three trusts. The court held that such action
had been taken without express consent of the beneficiaries after a
full disclosure of the facts and thus the respondent was in violation
of Canon 6 (representing conflicting interests) ," Canon 11 (using
money or other trust property coming into his possession) , 5 and
Canon 38 (accepting compensation from others without the knowledge and consent of his client after full disclosure)."
C.

Public Reprimands

Public reprimands were deemed appropriate in the following
instances: (1) where a judge who had participated in court proceedings while intoxicated had reformed, had fulfilled the obligations of his office, had been attentive to his duties, and had refrained
34. Canon 6. "It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning
of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it
is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose."
176 Ohio St. lxvi (1964).
35. Canon 29.
36. "A lawyer should accept no compensation, commissions, rebates or other advantages from others without the knowledge and consent of his client after full disclosure." 176 Ohio St. lxxv (1964).
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from the use or consumption of alcoholic beverages; 7 (2) where
a lack of diligence not amounting to unethical conduct was combined with mishandling of a client's monies;3 8 (3) failure of respondent to remit collections resulting in conversion of some part

thereof to respondent's own use where respondent admitted he was
careless, and the court, observing that this was his first act of misconduct, pointed out that he now appreciated the seriousness of the
position in which he had placed himself; 9 (4) representation of
both drivers involved in an automobile accident;4 ° (5) improper
handling of an estate and divorce case;4 1 and (6) improper handling
of certain financial matters where full restitution was made.42
D.

Dismissal

In Butler County Bar Ass'n v. Finkelman,43 an attorney, who
represented clients in matters before a zoning commission and opposed application for variances or changes in zoning, had initiated
referendum proceedings as to an ordinance granting variances and
had appealed to the court under the Administrative Procedure Act."
While the appeals were pending and the referendum petition was
being circulated, he wrote a letter to members of the city council
criticizing the zoning ordinances of the city and made suggestions'
regarding the setting up of a proper zoning procedure, offering his
services gratis to help create proper zoning machinery. A copy of
this letter was ultimately sent to the editor of a local newspaper.
The local bar association charged the attorney with misconduct in
that, allegedly motivated by ill feelings between himself and opposing counsel, he had offered the city his services as an attorney without pay knowing the city had an attorney, and had secured newspaper publicity and indirect advertising by sending letters to a newspaper for use in connection with the referendum and court actions.
The court found the evidence insufficient to justify disciplinary action. This was the only case in which the court so found.
37. Stark County Bar Ass'n v. Weber, 175 Ohio St. 13, 190 N.E.2d 918 (1963).
38. Trumbull County Bar Ass'n v. Ivanchak, 175 Ohio St. 561, 197 N.E.2d 193
(1964).
39. Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Robinson, 175 Ohio St. 536, 196 N.E.2d 784 (1964).
The Board had recommended that respondent be indefinitely suspended.
40. Columbiana Bar Ass'n v. Aronson, 37 OHIO BAR 80 (1964).
41. Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Yancey, 37 OHIo BAR 4 (1965).
42. Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. O'Malley, 37 OHIO BAR 4 (1964).
43.
44.

176 Ohio St. 309, 199 N.E.2d 589 (1964).
OHIo REV. CODE § 119.01.
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The power to end a person's right to earn his livelihood in a
profession and to attain that which he has devoted many years of
study and work is an awesome possession. And a court's obligation
"to apply the standards of professional and ethical conduct uniformly, without regard to length of practice or to the positions a respondent may hold in his community"4 5 is oft an extremely trying
task. To protect the public and the administration of justice and
then to make punishment fit the misconduct of which a wayward
practitioner has been guilty calls for perceptivity of a high order.
The imposition of punishment, generally, is difficult. It is certainly
so in this area.
II.

IMPERMISSIBLE CONDUCT OF ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW BY STATE
STANDARDS

VIEWED FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE

FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

A.

NAACP v. Button

The NAACP and the Educational Defense Fund, an affiliate,
encourage, assist, and finance legal proceedings against segregation
and for the attainment of civil rights. They furnish and pay their
staff lawyers to represent litigants in such proceedings.
The states, however, have the power to regulate unethical conduct of attorneys. Thus, in the State of Virginia, a statute forbids
the solicitation of legal business and defines a "runner" or "capper,"
embraced among those whose activities are so prohibited, to include
an agent for an individual or organization which retains a lawyer
in connection with an action to which it is not a party and in which
it has no pecuniary right or liability."4
In the Button case, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held
that the activities of the NAACP fell within such statutory prohibitions, and amounted to the fomenting of legal business in violation
of Canon 3547 (intervening lay organization's employment of lawyers to render legal services to its members in respect to their personal
45.

Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Dargusch, 177 Ohio St. 95, 99, 202 N.E.2d 625, 628

(1964).
46. 1932 Laws of Virginia 513 as paraphrased in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
423 (1963).
47. See NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 116 S.E.2d 55 (1960), rev'd sub rom.,
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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affairs) 48 and Canon 47 (unauthorized law practice) 9 of the American Bar Association Code of Professional Ethics which had previously been adopted by that court. The United States Supreme Court,
however, reversed."° The majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice
Brennan, held the activities of the NAACP, its affiliates, and their
legal staffs to be "modes of expression and association protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments... ."" The Court found the
language in the decree below which purported to allow the NAACP
to acquaint persons with what it believed to be their legal rights, to
advise them to assert such rights of suit and to assist them in such
suits by contributions of money, provided such suits "have not been
solicited [and]... channeled to ...attorneys"52 inviolation of the
aforesaid statute to be highly suspect.53 The Court was also of the
opinion that because of vagueness and overbreadth, the statute lent
itself to selective enforcement against unpopular causes and could
become a weapon of oppression, however even-handed its terms.54
Because in the area of first amendment freedoms the -threat of sanctions may "deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions,""m lawyers, thought the Court, would hesitate to
join in what the language in the decree purported to allow for fear
of disciplinary action.
Conceding validity to Virginia's interest in regulating traditionally illegal practices of barratry, and maintenance and champerty,
the Court could find no evidence in the record before it of any malice
or purely private pecuniary gain, a characteristic upon which com48.

The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by
any law agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and
lawyer. A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He
should avoid all relations which direct the performance of his duties by or in
the interest of such intermediary. A lawyer's relation to his client should
be personal, and the responsibility should be direct to the client. Charitable
societies rendering aid to the indigents are not deemed such intermediaries.
A lawyer may accept employment from any organization, such as an association, club or trade organization, to render legal services in any matter
in which the organization, as an entity, is interested, but this employment
should not include the rendering of legal services to the members of such an
organization in respect to their individual affairs. 171 Va. xxxii (1938).
49. "No lawyer shall permit his professional services, or his name, to be used in aid
of, or to make possible, the unauthorized practice of law by any lay agency, personal, or
corporate." 171 Va. xxxv (1938).
50. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
51. Id. at 428-29.
52. NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 165, 116 S.W.2d 55, 72 (1960).
53. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
54. Id. at 435, 436.
55. Id. at 433.
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mon law antipathy to such practices was based, nor any evidence of
NAACP interference in the actual conduct of litigation, neglect or
harassment of clients, nor any conflict in objectives between the
NAACP and its members. The Court declared that the state had
"failed to advance any substantial regulatory interest, in the form of
substantive evils"5 flowing from NAACP activities. Accordingly,
the Court held that the prohibitions imposed were unjustified. Mr.
Justice White agreed that the state statute was unconstitutional insofar as it forbade, by threatened criminal action, advising that particular attorneys be employed. However, he would have held the statute constitutional insofar as it forbade "management and dictation
of tactics, strategy and conduct of litigation.., by a lay agency such
as the NAACP."5 7
Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice
Stewart did not agree. In their dissenting opinion, they recognized
the first amendment right to advocate, to associate in order effectively to advocate, and to litigate in order to gain fundamental
rights. But the problem in each case the opinion recites is "to
weigh the legitimate interest of the State against the effect of the
regulation [by the State] on individual rights."5'
Accordingly, the dissenting justices would have tipped the scales
in favor of the state regulatory action in that the area of attempted
regulation in Button is one in which the states have traditionally
exercised power. There was also found to exist some evidence of
what might be regarded as impermissible conduct by the standard
of state accepted interpretations of the language of the Canons of
Professional Ethics.
The minority pointed to the undoubted right of the state to
exercise power in regulating the practice of law. Noted in particular was NAACP activity with respect to the prayer in pleadings, the
selection of plaintiffs and suit sites, and the timing of suits. Also
observed as incompatible with the normal attorney-client relationship was the ocasional omission of the name of any authorized counsel in the forms signed by prospective litigants, as well as the addition of co-counsel whether or not the forms contained such specific
authorization. Ergo, concludes the minority, the legitimate interest
of the state outweighed the incidental restrictive effect of its regulaion on the exercise of first amendment freedoms.
56.

Id. at 444.

57.
58.

Id. at 447.
Id. at 453.
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The state based its case in Button on claimed violations of Canons 35" and 470 which seek to prevent the interposition of a lay
intermediary between the lawyer and his client to the end that the
attorney-client relationship remains free from any possible dilution
of the lawyer's devotion to his client. Both canons were promulgated
to protect the public and prevent any disservice to the public interest; and this no one seriously contests. However, the wisdom and
soundness of a strict interpretation of these particular canons, which
would give rise to the suspicion that they were not being employed
to further the public interest, has long been challenged by respectable authority. 1 The minority opinion in Button took cognizance
of this challenge, 2 but refused to consider such a view on the ground
that any such consideration "raises questions of social policy which
have not been delegated to this Court for decision. 6 3 But does not
the minority here lose touch with logic? If we are to "weigh" state
regulatory action against the restrictive effect of such action on first
amendment freedoms, just as the minority itself phrases the problem, must we not for purposes of comparison use scales by which
the weight to be attributed to such action may be determined? What
better scales than those of reason may be so used?
In the circumstances of this case, the interest of every person
seeking to enjoy the rights and privileges of first class citizenship and there ought to be none other in the normal relations of our
citizenry to our society - is identical with the interest of the public
in the enjoyment of first amendment freedoms exercised in pursuit
of such rights and privileges. A lawyer's devotion to his client seeking to obtain such rights and privileges cannot, therefore, in a prag59. See note 48 supra.
60. See note 49 supra.
61. DRiNKER, LEGAL Em-ncs 67 n.54 (1953).

Commenting on a holding by the

Unauthorized Practice Committee of the American Bar Association that a lawyer may
not accept a retainer from a corporation or an association to advise or represent its

stockholders or members in connection with their personal affairs, Drinker writes:
"There would seem to be doubt as to the soundness of this conclusion. Such service
by doctors is extensively furnished without question and is furnished with increasing
frequency by labor unions and other organizations. It would seem to be one of the
efficient developments of modern life which it is both unwise and futile to oppose.
The public, it is believed, regards such opposition as in the interest of the lawyers and
not, as claimed, in the public interest. 'The duty of this court is not to protect the
bar from competition, but to protect the public from being advised or represented in
legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons.' Hulse v. Criger, 247 S.W.2d
855 (1952). See also Noone in 22 A.B.A.J. 609, 612 (1936)." See also DRINKER,
op. cit.
supra, at 161-67.
62. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 461 n.10 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
63. Id. at 461.
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matic sense, be diluted by the fact that the lawyer is paid by a segment of the public attempting to exercise such freedoms in assisting
the client's pursuit of such rights. State regulatory action tending
to inhibit such exercise of first amendment freedoms by invoking
the canons mentioned, when weighed upon such scales of reason,
will be shown to be invoking the mere form and not the real substance of such canons.
The absence of "substantive evils" deriving from NAACP activities in the Button case is thoroughly consonant with the fact that
they are in the public interest. It would be a paradox to permit the
canons to be employed to suppress such activities. But it may not
be amiss to recognize that the enjoyment of the rights and privileges
of equal citizenship by all persons may not be palatable to some
whose long entrenched postures make it difficult for them to accept
the implementation of such rights and privileges. This recognition,
however, cannot justify the use of standards, intended to serve the
public interest, as a means to insulate an artery hardened status quo
against the surgery which would allow the exercise of constitutionally protected freedoms to pump a refreshing blood supply through
the body politic thereby giving it meaningful health. The majority
view keeps pace with a tempo of constitutional interpretation which
will serve our society well in a world engulfed in a titanic struggle
for the minds of men.
B.

Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia
On April 20, 1964, the United States Supreme Court decided
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia.64 This case reached the
Court on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia to review an order affirming a decree of injunction rendered
by the Chancery Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia. The
Virginia court had found that Brotherhood activities constituted
solicitation of legal business and unauthorized practice of law. This
had resulted in the channeling of substantially all Federal Employer
Liability Act claims of Brotherhood members to lawyers chosen by
its department of legal counsel.
The Brotherhood admitted that it had advised injured members
and their dependents to obtain legal advice before making settlement
of their claims and that it recommended particular attorneys to handle such claims. As a result, cases were channeled to particular lawyers approved by the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood contended
64. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
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that the injunction below against these activities violated the first
and fourteenth amendments. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to consider the constitutional question raised in the light of the Button case. ..
-

In an opinion written by Mr. Justice Black the Court agreed with
the Brotherhood contention, and reviewed the role which it had
played in the evolution of the Federal Employers Liability Act, the
ends and purposes of Congress in its enactment, and the difficulties
attendant upon its implementation. The Court stated that the first
amendment's protection of the right of workers to assist and advise
each other includes. inseparably the right "personally or through a
special department of their Brotherhood to advise, concerning the
need for legal assistance and, most importantly, what lawyer a member could confidently rely on."" On the other hand, the Court recognized the State's right to regulate the practice of law within its.
borders; but in exercising this right the State may not ignore constitutionally secured rights of individuals. With respect to the Brotherhood's activities, the Court detected no commercialization of the,
legal profession, no threat to the moral and. ethical fabric of the
administration of justice and 'no ambulance chasing. "Laymen,"
said the Court, "cannot be expected to know how to protect their
rights when dealing with practiced and carefully counseled adversaries " . . and for them to. associate together to help one another
to preserve and enforce rights granted them under federal laws cannot be condemned as a threat to legal ethics. The State can no more
keep these workers from using their cooperative plan to advise one
another than it could use more direct means to bar them from resorting to the courts to vindicate their legal rights. The.right to
petition the courts cannot be so handicapped."6 7 Thus, the Court
could find no substantive evils flowing from the Brotherhood's activities as would demonstrate "any appreciable public interest in
preventing the Brotherhood from carrying out its plan to recommend
the lawyers it selects to represent injured workers."6 The associa65. Id. at 6.
66. Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
67. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 7 (1964). "If these
words express a constitutional principle, it is difficult to believe that the right to associate for the protection of individual rights is limited to matters affected by federal
laws."
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No. 367, p. 20 (1964).
68. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). The Court,
by footnote 9, takes cognizance of provisions in the decree below which enjoined the
Brotherhood from "sharing counsel fees" with recommended lawyers and countenancing
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tional rights of Brotherhood members were held entitled to the same
constitutional protection as were those of NAACP members in the
Button case. The Court struck down the decree below to the extent
that it "infringes on such rights" or forbids "these activities" and
added: "And, of course, lawyers accepting employment under this
constitutionally protected plan have a like protection which the State
cannot abridge." 9 The case was remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with the Court's opinion.
To Mr. Justice Clark, with whom Mr. Justice Harlan joined in
dissent, the majority view did relegate the practice of law to the
"level of a commercial enterprise."7
The dissent distinguished
Button on the grounds that: (1) the claimed privilege there was a
"form of political expression" designed to secure "constitutionally
protected civil rights," whereas in Brotherhood the objective sought
was the "settlement of damage claims;"'" and (2) in Button, "no
substantive evil would result from the activity there permitted...
whereas the past history of the union [the Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen] indicates the contrary."7 2 The dissent looked with disdain upon the relationship of the Brotherhood to its recommended
counsel and its other activities. In the minority's view, the whole
case involved only the regulation of the profession of law, a power
belonging to the state.
On January 15, 1965, the Chancery Court of the City of Richmond rendered its opinion upon remand. It interpreted the Supreme Court opinion as requiring it to hold that:
Any part of the decree of this court which forbade the members,
through the Brotherhood, from advising injured members to
obtain legal services and from recommending specific lawyers
violates their constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments and is null and void, and the decree should be
accordingly modified and amended; and any lawyers accepting
fee sharing by investigators, provided at its own expense, and pointing out that the
Brotherhood denies engaging in such practices since 1959, observes "Since the Brotherhood is not objecting to the other provisions of the decree except insofar as they might
later be construed as barring the Brotherhood from helping injured workers or their
families by recommending that they not settle without a lawyer and by recommending
certain lawyers selected by the Brotherhood, it is only to that extent that we pass upon
the validity of the other provisions." Id. at 5.

69. Id. at 8.
70. Id. at 9.
71.

Id. at 10.

72.

Ibid.

1965]

6 Gaines, Conduct of Attorneys

employment pursuant to such recommendations are similarly protected by these amendments. 3
In its final decree, the chancery court restated in detail the injunctive
provisions of the original decree, then added a paragraph which recited that nothing contained in the decree "shall be construed to infringe upon or restrict the constitutional rights of the defendant to
advise persons: to obtain legal advice" before making a settlement
and "to recommend a specific lawyer or lawyers to give such advice
or handle such claims," provided, however, that "the circumstances
of such advice and recommendation shall not constitute or amount
to the solicitation of legal employment" for any lawyer. The term
"solicit," adds the decree, "shall refer to the same terms as employed
or intended by the common law, the statutes of this state and Canons
of Legal Ethics of the American Bar Association adopted in this
74
state.
Whether the Brotherhod will assert that the language of limitation in the "provided however" clause renders this most recent decree vulnerable to a charge of vagueness and uncertainty remains to
be seen. However, it is plain that constitutionally protected conduct, in the context of the Supreme Court's opinion in Brotherhood,
was held irreconcilable with the Virginia statutes as then construed
by the Virginia courts. And certainly it is not easy to reconcile such
constitutionally protected rights with some interpretations of the
word "solicit" made in the application of the Canons of Professional
Ethics of the American Bar Association." The Chancery Court, justifying its conclusion that its former decree need be revised in only
two respects, quotes the Brotherhood's own recital of the vital question presented for review in its petition for certiorari:
Whether the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and its members
have the right to make known to its members generally, and to
injured members and their survivors in particular, first, the advisability of obtaining legal advice before making settlement of
their claims, and second, the names of attorneys, who, in its and
their opinion, have the capacity to handle such claims successfully,
and whether this right is protected by the First and 7Fourteenth
6
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States?
73. Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar Ass'n
R.R. Trainmen, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2387 (Feb. 9, 1965).
74. Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar Ass'n
R.R. Trainmen, Ch., Richmond, Va., Jan. 15, 1965.
75. "Prior to Brotherhood, it was generally thought that plans of
lawful. They appeared to violate the canons against solicitation.
President'sPage, 51 A.B.A.J. 1 (1965).
76. Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar Ass'n
R.R. Trainmen, Ch., Richmond, Va., Jan. 15, 1965.

v. Brotherhood of
v. Brotherhood of
this type were unPowell, The
v. Brotherhood of
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A conclusion could indeed be drawn that the Supreme Court's
opinion in Brotherhood did actually hold only that the right of the
Brotherhood to advise its members not to settle without first consulting counsel and the right to recommend certain attorneys at law
were constitutionally protected and immune to any restraints which
would have the effect of barring their exercise. But the question
remaining is: after Brotherhood - what? In Button, where the
NAACP itself furnished and paid the lawyer, the Court went to
some lengths to point out that there was absent any motivation of
private pecuniary gain. In Brotherhood, where the petitioner advised its members not to settle without consulting a lawyer and recommended certain lawyers whom it selected as capable and honest,
the Court found justified the exercise of associational rights "to assure that the workers would receive the full benefit of the compensatory damages Congress intended they should have.""
It is true that in Button the Court was concerned with modes of
political expression; but may it not also be appropriately observed
that the exercise of the constitutionally protected right of political
expression in the absence of meaningful access to an equal opportunity to gain and enjoy economic advantages would have an empty
and a hollow ring? Political expression and economic advantages
must be very close neighbors."8 Therefore, might not the Supreme
Court find constitutional protection for a plan whereby the Brotherhood, for instance, would furnish and pay counsel to serve its members as in Button? The answer may depend in part upon the kind of
record presented to the Court. However, in light of the language
in Button and in Brotherhood, one would expect more than a modicum of receptivity on the part of the Court to the position that such
an arrangement would be constitutionally protected.
III.

GROUP LEGAL SERVICE PLANS

It is and has been commonplace for attorneys to provide gratuitous legal aid to indigent persons. Legal aid societies, public defender associations, lawyer referral programs, and neighborhood
77. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 3 (1964). In Brotherhood, the majority observed that in Great Britain many unions do provide paid counsel
to members in personal lawsuits, a practice which the Court acknowledged was similar
to that upheld in Button.
78. The NAACP itself has fostered and financed litigation in which the immediate
objective was the economic benefit of members of the Negro race. See, e.g. Gaynor
v. Rockefeller, 15 N.Y.2d 120, 204 N.E.2d 627 (1965) (use of Negroes on governmental construction projects); Local 1, Independent Metal Workers Union (Hughes
Tool Co.), 147 N.L.R.B. 166 (1964) (discrimination in representation by unions by
giving better jobs to Caucasians.)
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legal service projects have all furnished, and continue to furnish,
ways and means of meeting demands for advice and guidance in
areas where the average layman moves with great trepidation and
grave fear. 9 Whatever the causes, be they the complexities of the
law itself, which at times can certainly be frightening, or the imagined or real costliness of legal advice, the belief is widespread that
all too many people do not receive needed legal advice.8" Thus,
group legal service plans, intended to encourage the public to seek
desirable, sound, and advantageous legal advice by offering such services at a most reasonable cost, have become the object of serious
concern and attention. In the eyes of the present national administration, pledged to its "Great Society," this area of activity is deemed
quite important. Quite recently, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare sponsored a Conference on the Extension of Legal
Services to the Poor. It was made clear that the department, without undue delay, will be active in promoting ways and means of
providing legal services to low income groups on some sort of a
group service basis.8 ' In addition, the Director of the Office of
Economic Opportunity, who is charged with conducting the "war
79. "There are now some 246 legal aid offices and 136 volunteer legal aid committees.
These agencies reported last year some half million new cases handled. [Lawyer referral]... is in effect in some 200 local bar associations. More than 60,000 cases were
referred to lawyers in 1963....
Powell, The President's Page, 51 A.B.A.J. 3, 20
(1965).
80. See address by Abrahams, National Conference of Bar Presidents, Summary of the
Proceedings of the New York Meeting, Aug. 9, 1964, p. 59; see also Powell, supra
note 79, at 3.
81. Held in Washington, D. C. November 12-14, 1964:
There has been long and devoted service... by legal aid societies and public
defenders in many cities. But, without disrespect to this important work, we
cannot translate our new concern into successful action simply by providing
more of the same. There must be new techniques, new services, and new
forms of inter-professional cooperation to match our new interest. Legal
scholarship is beginning to enter this new field - to analyze the rights of
welfare recipients, of installment purchasers, of people afflicted by slum housing, crime, and despair. There are signs, too, that a new breed of lawyers is
emerging, dedicated to using the law as an instrument of orderly and constructive social change.
Address by U.S. Attorney General Katzenbach, 9 A.B.A. News No. 13, Dec. 15, 1964,
p. 2; see also Powell, supra note 79, at 3, quoting address by R. Sargent Shriver, Director of OEO, outlining government plans for "supermarkets" of social service including
"legal assistance" and suggesting that advice and assistance might be rendered by lay
"aides" in situations where heretofore "we have assumed (such service) could only be
(rendered) by professionals."
At the Midyear Meeting of the American Bar Association, February, 1965, the
House of Delegates unanimously approved a resolution directing officers and committees to: "Cooperate with the Office of Economic Opportunity and other appropriate
groups in the development and implementation of programs for expanding availability
of legal services to indigents and persons of low income [and] ... to utilize to the maximum extent deemed feasible the experience and facilities of the organized bar, such as
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against poverty," spoke in November 1964 of legal assistance as one
of the elements in the services to be made available by the "war."
Thus, it is plain that the thinking of the administration transcends
just legal service to the indigent.82
The State Bar of California has responded with a commendable
awareness of the problem. Its Committee on Group Legal Services
determined after a lengthy study that: "there is a substantial need to
find better ways for clients to obtain lawyers who have experience
in the fields of laws which are involved in their particular problems.
Accordingly, the committee made specific proposals for
"legitimizing" group legal service plans under some measure of bar
control and guidance. The committee recommended that there be
determined specifically the kinds of permissible legal group service
plans and appropriate restrictions which should be made applicable
thereto.
A substantial part of the report was also devoted to another approach which the Committee deemed worthy of presentation. This
approach would create an administrative agency with authority to
approve any group legal service plan which complied with general
criteria set forth in appropriate rule or statute. The theory of this
approach is that it is too early in our experience in this field to become less than flexible. This would seem to be an appealing view.
The administrative agency members could be selected with bar participation. Criteria for allowance or disallowance of any proposed
plan, and subsequent review of the plan's operations could be provided.
The Button and Brotherhood cases each present a specie of group
activity, an integral part of which is concerned with the performance
of legal service. These cases did not spawn the concept of group
legal service plans. The constitutional perspective upon which these
legal aid, legal defender, and lawyer referral . . . . to be performed by lawyers in accordance with ethical standards of the legal profession."
R. Sargent Shriver responded that "the OEO stands ready to work with the American Bar Association with state and local bars, with Legal Aid and Public Defender
agencies, with Lawyer Referral Services and with all fragments of the legal profession.
Like you, we hold no brief for any one solution. The need is there. It is urgent. We
applaud your willingness to concentrate the need, to shape your response to fit the
need, and to innovate where need calls for innovation." 10 A.B.A. News No. 2, Feb.
15, 1965, p. 1.
82. "The term 'the poor,' moreover, is being used in a broader sense than indigency.
The focus of the Washington conference was on the '20 per cent of our population'
in the lowest income brackets." Powell, supra note 79, at 3.
83. See A.B.A. COORDINATION SERVICE RELEASE, State Bar of California,State Bar
Committee on GroupLegal Services, p. 1 (undated). Release of report not to be deemed
approval but as invitation for comment by Bar members.
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cases were decided, however, may point to a direction to which advocates of such plans may turn if their efforts are met by inelastic and
intransigent opposition of entrenched precepts and obstinately immobile positions.8 4
A Committee of the American Bar Association has already been
created to study revision of the canons. The California State Bar
Report suggests that some revision of the canons to permit implementation of its recommendations is in order; however, it will doubtless engender spirited controversy. 5 In sum, the situation would
seem to call for the profession to have an open mind and a will to
resolve this development in the public interest and in the furtherance of the administration of justice under our adversary system."s
IV.

FAIR TRIAL VERSUS FREE PRESS

The impropriety of lawyer participation in communications
media publicity related to litigation and its attendant potential interference with a fair trial has been generally recognized as the import of Canon 20, and just as generally more "honour'd in the breach
than the observance."8 " The advent of electronic media has heightened immeasurably the potential of denial of fair trial by an impartial jury. Communications media coverage, particularly of criminal
There is a growing awareness .. . that a denial or limitation of ... legal
rights ... may cause or aggravate numerous social ills. More and more we
are coming to recognize the necessity of an interdisciplinary approach which
seeks the causes and cures of legal and social problems simultaneously or at
least concurrently.
The tendency is increasing in our civilization to couch such problems in
legal terms and to seek solutions through the litigating process in an adversary setting.
[WMe would delude ourselves if we concluded that our problem was what
should the Bar do about group legal service plans and neighborhood centers....
We submit that the question to be faced is: How can adequate legal services be made available to the public on a basis which the public will accept?
The lesson to be learned from Button, Brotherhood and the War on Poverty is that the public has begun to seek its own answers to that question.
Committee on Lawyer Referral Services - Midyear Report to House of Delegates, Feb. 1965, 13 A.B.A. COORDINATOR 1 (1965).
85. The American Bar Association Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of the
Law expressed its opposition to the California Report's recommendation re group legal
services together with appropriate changes in the Canons. 10 A.B.A. News No. 2, Feb.
15, 1965, p. 1.
86. "Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may
interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration
of justice. Generally they are to be condemned. If the extreme circumstances of a
particular case justify a statement to the public, it is unprofessional to make it anonymously. An ex parte reference to the facts should not go beyond quotation from the
records and papers on file in the court;, but even in extreme cases it is better to avoid
any ex parte statement." 176 Ohio St. lxx (1964).
87. See Wright, A Judge's View: The News Media and Original Justice, 50 A.B.A.J.
1125 (1964).
84.
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matters, has now become highly repetitive, intense, and extensive."
Courts are being confronted time and again with claims that the publicity atteridant upon a given trial has prevented a fair trial by an
impartial jury. 9 It was such a claim which prompted the Supreme
Court of New Jersey9" to take the occasion to pronounce its views on
the conduct of lawyers, including prosecutors, with respect to publicity potentially prejudicial to a fair trial. It stated:
We interpret these canons, particularly Canon 20, to ban statements to news media by prosecutors, assistant prosecutors and
their lawyer staff members, as to alleged confessions or inculpatory
admissions by the accused, or to the effect that the case is "open
and shut" against the defendant, and the like, or with reference
to the defendant's prior criminal record, either of convictions or
arrests. Such statements have the capacity to interfere with a fair
trial and cannot be countenanced....
The ban on statements by the prosecutor and his aides applies
as well to defense counsel. The right of the State to a fair trial
cannot be impeded or diluted by out-of-court assertions by him
to news media on the subject of his client's innocence. The
courtroom is the place to settle the issue and comments before
or during the trial which have the capacity to influence potential
or actual jurors to the possible prejudice of the State are impermissible.91
The court also noted Canon 5 which deals with the duty of a prosecutor to promote justice."
It is obvious that lawyers provide the communications media
with a fertile source of information. And such media have not hesitated to tell the bar that before it points a finger of scorn and blame
at the media for prejudicial publicity, it should clean up its own
house." The media have a point in this respect. Ought not every
88.

For a good many years, the lawyers and the news media have been battling
each other with great vehemence and vigor. The news media champion
"The public's Right to Know." This presented problems enough when only
the press was involved. It became far more difficult with the advent of radio,
as those who lived through the Hall-Mills and the Hauptmann cases in the
1920's and the 1930's will recall. The excesses experienced there were, indeed, the specific background for Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
of the American Bar Association. Finally, with the advent of television, the
problem has become even more intense. Address by Dean Griswold, LawLaymen Program, Section of Judicial Administration of A.B.A., August, 1964.
89. See letter from Justice Geller. N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1963, p. 38, col. 5.
90. State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964).
91. Id. at 389, 204 A.2d at 852 (1964) But cf. Opinion 199 A.B.A. Committee on
Professional Ethics and Grievances, paraphrased in DRINKER, op. cit. supra note 61,
at 70.
92. "The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict,
but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the secreting of witnesses
capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible."
93.

See Daly, Ensuring Fair Trials and a Free Press: A Task for the Press and The

Bar Alike, 50 A.B.A.J. 1037, 1040 (1964).
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effort be made vigorously and energetically to enforce Canon 20 if
the interpretation of this canon by the New Jersey Supreme
Court is accepted? And, if perchance the canon which was
adopted in 1908 needs revision and new teeth, should not
whatever dental work it needs be performed at the earliest possible
moment?9" If the bar is to protect fair trial by an impartial jury
against a publicity barrage inimical to such constitutional right,
it should indeed be invulnerable to the charge that it has condoned the part its members play in the very publicity it condemns.
The mike-draped neck and clicking camera with their promise
of a prompt showing before millions of eyes and ears is a tidbit of
surpassing temptation. There can be little doubt, however, that its
potential for prejudicial impact on impartiality under our adversary
system of justice is substantial. Lawyers, particularly, should be
required to subordinate such allure to obviously overriding considerations of fair trial and justice, considerations which ought to
be the essence of Canon 20. As the effort to resolve the confrontation of so-called fair trial versus free press becomes more advanced,
more effective enforcement of Canon 20 must come to pass. Unless
this be done the hypocrisy implicit in avoidance of its plain import will plague the profession.
V.

OTHER SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS

Several other recent decisions have left a significant impact on
Ohio law respecting conduct of attorneys. In one case a railroad,
with knowledge that its employee had retained a lawyer on a: contingent fee contract to represent him in a Federal Employers' Liability Act claim, nevertheless settled the case directly with such
employee. In an action by the employee's attorney to recover the
amount to which his contingent fee arrangement entitled him, the
railroad contended that the contract between the plaintiff's attorney
and its employee was void. The argument was that the attorney,
in addition to being counsel for plaintiff, was legal counsel for the
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, and that the employee had
entered into the contract with the lawyer only by reason of the
activities and recommendation of a B.R.T. representative. Therefore, the railroad concluded that the contract was void as it violated
Canons 35 and 47 which prohibit such activity. However, the dis94. See amendment adopted by the New York State Bar Association on January 25,
1957.
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trict court found 5 the contract to have been entered into voluntarily; it expressed the view that the question thus raised by the
defendant, if it believed it to have merit, should have been presented
as a disciplinary matter to the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Ohio Supreme Court.
In another important case, the Ohio Supreme Court reasserted
its position that the Ohio Constitution gives it the inherent power
to "regulate, control and define the practice of law," and held that
the rendering of advice and services in the preparation and presentation of claims under the Workmen's Compensation Laws of Ohio
for a fee constitutes the practice of law. 6 Non-lawyers, therefore,
may not hold themselves out as qualified to render such advice and
services, despite statutory provision for representation before the Industrial Commission by "attorneys, agents, or representatives."
These statutes were enacted pursuant to authority in the Ohio Constitution reposing in the General Assembly the power to pass laws
establishing a state fund and a board empowered to determine rights
of claimants to participate therein.
The supreme court also, during the year past, invoked its infrequently required power of contempt in cases involving discipline to
impose jail sentences and a fine where the respondent, previously
disciplined, failed to appear to answer new charges of misconduct
in relation to his activities.9"
VI.

CONCLUSION

American society is witnessing change, in varying degrees, on
many fronts. The legal profession is no exception. A strong case
could always be made for bar association recognition of the need
for an elasticity in viewpoint and thought compatible with the public interest. It is especially so now. So long as society remains
flexible and makes an effort to meet the evolving needs of our citizenry, so too must the legal profession, as an integral part of that
society, remain alert to prevent a public image that professional
standards are selfishly motivated and selfishly implemented for
individual benefit.
The decisions and developments in the years 1963 and 1964
demonstrate amply that more than lip service will be paid to constitutional guarantees. This movement doubtless will continue.
95.
96.
97.

Dombey v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R., 226 F. Supp. 345 (S.D. Ohio 1964).
In re Brown, Weiss and Wohl, 175 Ohio St. 149, 192 N.E.2d 54 (1963).
In re Crow, 36 OHo BAR 1125 (1963).

